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Virtual organizations (VOs) are communities of resource providers and users distributed over multiple policy domains. These 
VOs often wish to define and enforce consistent policies in addition to the policies of their underlying domains. This is 
challenging, not only because of the problems in distributing the policy to the domains, but also because of the fact that those 
domains may each have different capabilities for enforcing the policy. The Community Authorization Service (CAS) solves 
this problem by allowing resource providers to delegate some policy authority to the VO while maintaining ultimate control 
over their resources. In this paper we describe CAS and our past and current implementations of CAS, and we discuss our plans 
for CAS-related research. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A virtual organization (VO) is a dynamic collection of 
resources and users unified by a common goal and 
potentially spanning multiple administrative domains 
[12] VOs introduce challenging management and policy 
issues, resulting from often complex relationships 
between local site policies and the goals of the VO with 
respect to access control, resource allocation, and so 
forth. In particular, authorization solutions are needed 
that can empower VOs to set policies concerning how 
resources assigned to the “community” are used—
without, however, compromising site policy 
requirements. 
We describe here our implementation of the 
Community Authorization Service (CAS), a system that 
we have developed as part of a solution to this problem. 
CAS allows for a separation of concerns between site 
policies and VO policies. Specifically, sites can delegate 
management of a subset of their policy space to the VO. 
CAS provides a fine-grained mechanism for a VO to 
manage these delegated policy spaces, allowing it to 
express and enforce expressive, consistent policies 
across resources spanning multiple independent policy 
domains. Both past and present CAS implementations 
build on the Globus Toolkit® middleware for Grid 
computing [10], thus allowing for easy integration of 
CAS with existing Grid deployments. 
The rest of this article is as follows. In Section 2, we 
describe the scenarios that CAS is designed to support, 
review the Globus Toolkit’s authorization systems, and 
explain why CAS is needed. In Section 3, we introduce 
CAS architecture and concepts. In Section 4, we describe 
the current and present CAS implementations and future 
implementation plans. In Section 5, we discuss the 
relationship of CAS to PERMIS, VOMS, and other 
related authorization technologies and how 
standardization can enable interoperability among them. 
In Section 6, we describe our plans for future CAS-
related research.  
 
 
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
We first describe the scenarios that CAS was designed 
to solve, review the current Globus Toolkit authorization 
system, and explain the system limitations that motivated 
development of CAS. 
2.1. Consistent Distributed Policy 
While all the physical organizations in a virtual 
organization may in principle agree to allow the VO 
access to its resources, each organization will typically 
retain ultimate control over the policies that govern 
access to its resources. Nevertheless, the VO will often 
wish to apply some common policy about how its users 
access the resources assigned to the VO. For example, a 
subset of users may have read-only access to VO data, 
while others may have full access to publish or modify 
data. Some data may be sensitive until published and 
restricted to a very limited set of VO members. 
Since VO resources are located within multiple 
organizations, maintaining a consistent policy means 
having access control enforced by each of the 
organizations in a consistent manner. Achieving this 
consistency is difficult because each site potentially has 
different mechanisms for policy expression and 
enforcement and these different mechanisms may have 
different abilities in terms of the granularity of the policy 
they can express. Using local policy mechanisms to 
enforce VO policies would limit those policies to the 
least common denominator of the abilities of the site 
mechanisms (which can potentially change when new 
sites are added to the VO). 
Complicating this situation is the fact that the 
resources may be dynamic and may also have dynamic 
policies. For example, a VO can have a number of 
datasets as part of its resources. While these datasets are 
stored on resources owned by the organizations that the 
VO spans, the VO wishes to apply its own policy 
regarding access to the datasets. These datasets may be 
dynamically created or copied; for example, a demand 
for access to a dataset by a user at a particular location 
might motivate a replica of the dataset being 
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automatically created at the location to improve the 
user’s access (as described in [1]). These data replicas 
should have access control policies identical to the 
original from they are copied, in order to maintain a 
consistent policy in regard to access to the data. This 
policy in turn may be dynamic, meaning the policy on 
the replicas must mirror it as it changes. 
The use of site mechanisms also has the complication 
that policy itself must be replicated: a change in the 
policy requires an update at multiple sites. The 
temporarily unavailability of a site during such an 
update, can lead to inconsistencies in the policy across 
the VO. 
2.2. Authorization Middleware 
Middleware for VOs has been available for several 
years. Most notable is the Globus Toolkit (GT) [10], 
which is freely available and widely deployed.  
 
2.2.1. Globus Toolkit Features 
 
The Globus Toolkit normally uses existing local 
resource mechanisms for authorization. A user is 
authenticated and then mapped to a local identity (e.g., a 
Unix account) by a local configuration file (the grid-
mapfile). This mapping also serves as an access control 
check: if the user is not listed in the local mapping 
configuration, access to the resource is denied. 
Once the user is mapped to a local identity, the Globus 
Toolkit then relies solely on local policy management 
and enforcement mechanisms to constrain the user’s 
actions to those allowed by local policy. This approach 
removes the fine-grained policy configuration and 
decision making from the GT services (e.g., GridFTP, 
GRAM) and allows the local operating system to act as a 
sandbox. Thus, administrators can use normal policy 
administration tools to configure policy. For example, a 
Globus Toolkit user is normally mapped to a local Unix 
account. Standard Unix filesystem permissions, quotes, 
group memberships, and so forth are then used to 
configure and enforce policy. 
Similar techniques could be used in conjunction with 
dynamically allocated accounts or virtual machine 
technology [9]. 
 
2.2.2. Limitations of GT Classic  
 
The classic Globus Toolkit authorization system 
described has the advantage of being easy for site 
administrators to understand and configure because it 
uses existing local policy management and enforcement 
mechanisms with which the administrator is presumably 
already familiar. In terms of supporting a large VO, 
however, the GT has several shortcomings: 
 
• Scalability: each personnel or policy change requires 
changing policy at each participating site; 
• Lack of expressiveness: native OS methods may not 
be expressive enough to support VO policies; 
• Consistency: different native OS methods may not 
support the same kinds of policies;  
• Distribution: in order to maintain a consistent policy 
across the VO, each policy change must be 
propagated to each site involved. Any failure in 
propagation will cause an inconsistency in the 
policy. 
 
To solve these problems, we undertook the 
development of the CAS system, described in the 
following section. 
3. CAS CONCEPTS 
We now introduce CAS and describe how it solves the 
problems described in Section 2. 
3.1. Policy Management 
CAS allows a VO to maintain its own set of policies 
explicitly and communicate those policies to sites. The 
sites then combine their local policies (about what the 
VO is allowed to do) with the VO’s policies (about what 
the individual user is allowed to do as a VO member) 
and enforce this combined policy. 
The VO, through administration of the CAS server, 
maintains the VO’s portion of this combined policy. This 
portion of the policy includes the following: 
 
• The VO’s access control policies regarding its 
resources: which rights are granted to which users 
(e.g., which users can read which files); 
• The CAS server’s own access control policies, such 
as who can delegate rights or maintain groups with 
the VO. These policies can be expressed at a fine-
grained level (e.g., a user may be allowed to grant 
rights on only certain resources, or add users to only 
certain groups);  
• The list of VO members. 
 
The other part of this combined policy, the resource 
provider’s policy regarding the VO, is maintained by the 
resource provider using the same native mechanisms 
used for non-VO users. For example, a site may create a 
local identity representing a VO and add local 
configuration mapping users presenting credentials from 
that VO’s CAS server to that identity. The site would 
then use local mechanisms to set policy on the VO as a 
whole, for example, change file ownerships to allow the 
VO identity read and write access to a particular subset 
of the file system, or set file system quotas limiting the 
amount of space that the VO can use. A resource 
provider may use this mechanism to maintain policies 
for several VOs, each running its own CAS server. 
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3.2. Policy Enforcement 
Resource providers participating in a VO with CAS 
will deploy CAS-enabled services (i.e., services 
modified to enforce the policy in the CAS credentials) 
onto resources they assign to the VO. A user wishing to 
access those resources first contacts the VO’s CAS 
server and requests a CAS credential. The CAS server 
replies with a CAS credential that contains a policy 
statement of that user’s rights, cryptographically signed 
by the CAS server. 
When making a request to the resource, the user 
presents the CAS credential. Upon receiving the CAS 
credential, a CAS-enabled service takes several steps to 
enforce both VO and local policy: 
 
• Verify the validity of the CAS credentials (e.g., 
signature, time period). 
• Enforce the site’s policies regarding the VO, 
using essentially the same method as an 
unmodified server. However, the identity used 
when enforcing the site’s policies is the identity of 
the signer of the policy assertion (i.e., the VO’s 
CAS server), not the identity of the individual 
user authenticating.  
• Enforce the VO’s policies regarding the user, as 
expressed in the signed policy statement in the 
CAS credential. 
• Optionally, enforce any additional site policies in 
regard to the user (for example, a site may keep a 
blacklist of end users who are not allowed to 
perform any action, regardless of any VO policy). 
 
 
Access
Granted by
Community
To user
Access
Granted by site
To community
Effective 
access
Access granted
By site to user  
Figure 1: Effective access control policy in CAS. 
 
Thus, as shown in Figure 1, the set of rights the user is 
effectively granted by these steps is the intersection of 
the set of rights granted by the resource server to the VO 
and the set of rights granted by the VO to the user 
(optionally modified by any site policy specific to the 
user). 
4. CAS IMPLEMENTATIONS 
We review past and current CAS implementations and 
discuss future implementation plans. We start with a 
review of Globus Toolkit proxy certificates, a key 
component of CAS implementations. Next we discuss 
the initial and current CAS prototype releases, 
explaining the differences between them and the 
motivations for those changes. We then discuss the 
upcoming CAS release in a future release of version 3 of 
the Globus Toolkit. 
4.1. Proxy Certificate Overview 
CAS is designed and implemented to work with the 
Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [2][13], which 
provides the security functionality of the Globus Toolkit. 
For authentication, GSI uses X.509 proxy certificates 
[22] to provide credentials for users and to allow for 
delegation and single sign-on. 
Proxy certificates are similar to the standard X.509 
end entity certificates (EECs) [6] from which they are 
derived. The primary difference is that users issue proxy 
certificates to create a short-term (e.g., one-day) 
delegation of their rights to another entity (e.g., a process 
running on their behalf) as opposed to EECs, which are 
issued by certificate authorities to assign a long-term 
identity. The short-term nature of proxy certificate 
credentials allows them to be more lightly protected than 
the credentials associated with the long-term EEC 
credentials that are used to create them. For example, 
proxy certificate credentials are usually protected with 
local filesystem permissions as opposed to being 
encrypted. This approach allows their use for single 
sign-on and by unattended processes. 
EEC
Proxy
Client
Service
(1)
(2)
Proxy
(3)
 
Figure 2: Proxy certificate creation and delegation. The 
steps are explained in the text. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, step 1, the creation of a proxy 
certification can be local to a single resource (usually for 
use by subsequent clients, to enable single sign-on). As 
shown in step 2, the proxy certificate can then be used 
with GSI to authenticate to a remote service and 
establish a secure connection. Proxy certificates can also 
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be used to issue other proxy certificates, allowing for a 
chain of delegations as shown in step 3, where a proxy 
certificate is created across the GSI-secure network 
channel (to delegate rights to the service so it can act on 
the original user’s behalf).  
Normally a proxy certificate allows its bearer to assert 
the full rights of the bear of the EEC that issued it. This 
delegation can be restricted through the use of a policy 
embedded in the proxy certification, as we discuss in the 
CAS implementation in the following section.  
4.2. Initial CAS Prototype 
Our initial CAS prototype [4], as described in [17], 
was released in March 2002. This implementation 
includes a CAS server, appropriate administration and 
user clients, and a GridFTP server [1] modified to 
understand and honor CAS credentials. The 
implementation uses the pyGlobus toolkit [16] to 
facilitate implementation using Python. 
This implementation uses restricted proxy certificates, 
as described in Section 4.1, issued by the CAS server to 
the user. The proxy certificate identifies the user as a 
member of the VO (by virtue of the user’s bearing a 
proxy certificate issued by the CAS server) and the 
rights the user possesses in the VO (through the 
restrictions in the proxy certificate). As shown in Figure 
3, the effective rights of the user then become the subset 
of the rights granted by the resource to the VO and the 
VO to the user. 
Access
granted by
community
to user
(via CAS policy)
Access
granted by site
to community
(via account)
Effective access
 
Figure 3: Effective access control policy in initial CAS 
prototype. 
 
As described in Section 3.2, resources create an 
account for the virtual organization (VO) and grant some 
set of rights to the account. Each VO then sets up a CAS 
server and configures its policy in that server to express 
each user's rights within the VO. 
Figure 4 shows the details of CAS alphaR1 use. The 
steps are as follows: 
 
CAS
Server
Community
Resource
(1) Logon
(3) Request
(2) Restricted CAS Proxy
Community
Policy
 
Figure 4: Use of initial CAS prototype. Steps are 
described in the text. 
 
1. The user authenticates, using personal proxy 
credentials, to the VO's CAS server. The CAS 
authenticates the user and establishes that user’s 
rights in the VO by using a local policy database. 
2. The CAS server then issues to the user a restricted 
proxy certificate. This proxy certificate, as shown 
in Figure 5, has the identity of the CAS server, 
identifying the user as a VO member, and a 
restriction policy expressing the rights of the user 
within the VO. 
3. The user uses the CAS proxy certificate to 
authenticate to a resource as a VO member. Based 
on that certificate, the resource allows the user to 
access the resource using the VO account but 
constrains the user’s activities using the 
restrictions in the proxy certificate. 
 
After the release of the initial CAS prototype in early 
2002, we received useful feedback from both VO 
administrators and resource sites. The largest concern 
raised by the sites was their inability to identify the user 
connecting to them with CAS credentials at a finer level 
of granularity than a member of a particular VO (i.e., 
they could not verify the actual user identity). A number 
of these sites have policy requirements dictated by their 
funding agencies to identify users of their computational 
resources. 
We proposed that the CAS server, which authenticates 
the user and hence has access to their identity, could 
encode the user identity in a non-critical X.509 extension 
[6] to the proxy certificate. This solution was also of 
concern to the resource providers because it required 
them to trust the CAS server as to the identity of the 
user. This caused them to place more trust in the CAS 
server than they were comfortable with. 
This concern led to the redesign of CAS and the 
release of the alphaR2 prototype described in the 
following section. 
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Subject: /CN=CAS/CN=Proxy
Issuer: /CN=CAS
Valid from: 3/25/03 13:00
Valid to: 3/25/03 21:00
Restrictions (critical extension):
Only these actions are allowed
by VO policy:
Read gridftp://myhost/mydir/*
Write gridftp://myhost/myfile
{Signature of all the above by 
CAS server}
 
Figure 5: Example of a restricted proxy certificate, 
simplified for clarity, issued by initial CAS prototype. 
The certificate identifies the user as a member of the VO 
and the restrictions enumerate the user's rights within the 
VO. 
 
4.3. Second CAS Prototype 
Building on the first CAS prototype and the community 
feedback it elicited, we redesigned CAS and, in 
September 2002, released the alphaR2 prototype [5]. The 
major feature added in this release was to enable 
resources to identify a user operating with CAS 
credentials to the same degree of certainty as they could 
a user using standard Globus Toolkit proxy credentials. 
That is, a resource could derive not only the user's VO 
membership but also the user’s identity. The contents of 
this release—a CAS server, clients and a CAS-enabled 
GridFTP server—are otherwise functionally identical to 
the first prototype. 
To implement this feature, we changed the model from 
the use of a restricted proxy certificate issued by the 
CAS server to a model that combines a proxy certificate 
issued by the user with a signed policy assertion issued 
by the CAS server. The resulting credential is shown in 
Figure 6. 
The policy assertions issued by the CAS server 
includes a set of access rights along with the user’s 
identity. This assertion allows a resource to verify the 
user’s VO membership, by the fact the assertion has the 
user’s identity in it, and the user’s rights within the VO 
as listed in the assertion. The assertion also includes a 
validity period and signature allowing resources to verify 
the validity of the assertion. 
This separation of CAS policy assertion from user 
proxy credentials allows resources accepting these 
credentials to identify the user involved in a request as if 
they were using normal GSI credentials. This strategy in 
turn allows a site to use normal mechanisms for auditing 
and to apply an additional level of policy enforcement 
based on the user’s identity. The applied policy, as 
shown in Figure 3, becomes the intersection of the rights 
granted to the community by the site, the rights granted 
to the user by the community and any restrictions placed 
on the user by the site. 
 
Authorization Assertion
Subject: /CN=Joe User
Issuer: /CN=CAS
Valid from: 3/25/03 13:00
Valid to: 3/25/03 21:00
Rights:
These actions are allowed:
Read gridftp://myhost/mydir/*
Write gridftp://myhost/myfile
{Signature of assertion by CAS 
server}
Subject: /CN=Joe User/CN=Proxy
Issuer: /CN=Joe User
Valid from: 3/25/03 12:00
Valid to: 3/25/03 23:00
{Signature of all the above by 
User}
 
Figure 6: An example CAS alphaR2 credential, 
simplified for clarity. A user proxy is combined with a 
policy assertion issued by the CAS server. 
 
Figure 7 shows the details of second CAS prototype 
usage. The steps in the figure are as follows: 
 
1. The user authenticates, using personal proxy 
credentials, to the CAS server serving the user’s 
virtual organization (VO). The CAS server 
established the user's identity and rights in the VO 
using a local policy database. 
2. The CAS server issues the user a signed policy 
assertion containing the users identity and rights in 
the VO. The CAS client generates a new proxy 
certificate for the user and embeds the CAS policy 
assertion in the proxy certificate as a noncritical 
X.509 extension [6]. This embedding of the 
assertion in the proxy is not necessary from a 
security perspective but instead allows any 
application that can use a normal GSI proxy to be 
able to use the proxy with CAS assertion embedded 
in it, as it looks like a standard proxy certificate to 
existing APIs and protocols. 
3. The user uses the proxy certificate with the 
embedded CAS assertion to authenticate to a 
resource. The resource authenticates the user using 
normal GSI authentication, allowing it to determine 
the user's identity and apply local policy as desired. 
It then parses the policy assertion in the proxy 
certificate and, based on the assertion, allows the 
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user to access the resource using the VO account but 
constrains the user’s activities using the rights in the 
assertion. 
 
CAS
Server
Community
Resource
(1) Logon
(3) Request
(2) Authorization assertion
Community
Policy
User proxy with
CAS assertion
 
Figure 7: Second CAS prototype usage. Steps are 
described in the text. 
4.4. Summer 2003 Release 
Building from the earlier prototypes described in the 
preceding sections, we are planning on releasing a new 
version of CAS built on version 3 of the Globus Toolkit 
(GT3) [15]. This version of CAS will be conceptually 
similar to the second prototype described in the 
preceding section but will have a number of significant 
differences: 
 
• Implements an OGSA Service. It will reside in a 
GT3 hosting environment and implement an Open 
Grid Service Architecture [11] service. Protocols 
to access CAS will use common Web services 
methods such as SOAP [20]. 
• Has a Java code base. To facilitate its integration 
with GT3, the CAS will be written in Java. 
• Uses SAML for assertion format. The new version 
of CAS will use the security assertion markup 
language (SAML) [19] as the format for the 
policy assertions issued by the CAS server. This 
will allow for easy integration with Web services 
and OGSA tooling. 
 
Our intent is to release this new version of CAS with a 
version of the Globus Toolkit in late summer 2003. This 
release will include many functional elements present in 
the earlier prototypes, namely, a CAS server, clients for 
users and administrators, and a CAS-aware GridFTP 
server. It will also include a Java client library and a C 
library to allow for CAS-enabling services (i.e., allowing 
them to accept and properly enforce CAS-issued 
assertions). 
5. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER WORK 
We compare CAS to other authorization services and 
explain how we see standardization allowing these 
services to interoperate. 
5.1. VOMS 
The Virtual Organization Management Service 
(VOMS) [23] and CAS are similar architecturally in that 
both issue policy assertions to a user that the user then 
presents to a resource for the purpose of obtaining VO-
issued rights. The primary difference between the two 
systems is the level of granularity at which they operate. 
As shown in Figure 8, VOMS assertions contain a list 
of role or group memberships held by the user. The user 
presents this assertion to a resource, which then 
determines that user’s rights based on their memberships 
and local policies about those memberships. In effect the 
policy about what memberships a user has is centralized 
in the VOMS server, but the policy regarding exactly 
what rights those memberships grant is distributed 
among the sites. 
CAS assertions provide the rights directly and do not 
need interpretation by the resource. As discussed in 
Section 2, in situations where policies are changing 
dynamically, we believe this complete centralization of 
policy can achieve better consistency. 
However, while CAS was designed primarily to do 
fine-grained policies, our research has shown it is also 
capable of asserting coarser grained group memberships 
[3]. 
 
CAS VOMS
Group
memberships
Group
rights
Community
Resource
Group
memberships
Group
rights
Rights Groups
 
Figure 8: Difference between CAS and VOMS models. 
VOMS issues group memberships, which are mapped to 
rights by a resource. CAS issues rights directly. 
 
5.2. Akenti and PERMIS 
Akenti [21] and PERMIS [7], while having differences 
in implementation and features, are architecturally 
similar in that they provide a resource with an 
authorization decision in regards to a request. Both 
follow the basic model: 
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1. A resource authenticates a requestor and validates 
their identity as well as possibly some additional 
attributes. 
2. The resource receives and parses the user's request. 
3. The resource then passes the identity, attributes, and 
request to Akenti or PERMIS and requests an 
authorization decision (i.e., whether is should 
service or reject the request). 
4. Akenti or PERMIS then returns a decision to the 
resource and which enforces it. 
 
While our CAS implementations provide simple 
authorization decision functionality, they are limited to 
supporting CAS policy assertions and does not have as 
rich a feature set as either Akenti or PERMIS. It is 
possible that either of these systems, with some 
modifications, could be used to provide resource-side 
functionality for CAS (i.e., parse the CAS assertion and 
use it to authorize the user's request.) 
5.3. Standardization of Assertions 
We see potential for allowing interoperability between 
CAS and the other authorization systems mentioned in 
this section by standardizing on a format for 
authorization assertions. Today, both CAS and VOMS 
each issue assertions in a different and nonstandard 
format that requires custom code on the resource side to 
interpret for authorization. 
By standardizing the format for the assertions issued 
by services such as CAS and VOMS, we can enable 
authorization decision services to be able to parse and 
use these assertions in their decision-making as shown in 
Figure 9. The steps are as follows: 
 
1. An assertion service like CAS or VOMS would 
issue an assertion to a user regarding either that 
user's attributes (e.g., group memberships) or rights. 
2. The user would present this assertion to a resource 
when making a request (probably along with 
authenticating their identity.) 
3. The resource would then present the request, 
identity and assertion to an authorization decision 
service such as Akenti or PERMIS. 
4. The authorization decision service would parse the 
assertion and use it, along with local policy, to 
render a decision that it returns to the resource. 
 
X.509 attribute certificates [6] are one possibility for a 
standard assertion format. Given the influence of Web 
services in emerging Grid standards [11], however, we 
believe a standard more in line with current Web 
services efforts should be considered. We are 
experimenting with the security assertions markup 
language (SAML) [19], a standard for formatting 
authorization and attribute assertions, as a format for our 
next release of CAS as described in Section 4.4. We also 
plan on working in the Global Grid Forum [14] in order 
to standardize the use of SAML for supporting 
authorization in VOs.  
 
VO
policy
Local
policy
Community
resourceCAS or
VOMS
Akenti or
PERMIS
(1)
(2)
(3) (4)
 
Figure 9: A standard assertion format would allow 
authorization systems such as CAS, VOMS, Akenti and 
PERMIS to interoperate. Steps are described in the text. 
 
6. FUTURE WORK 
We plan future research activities in regard to CAS.  
6.1. Caching Server 
The current CAS server implementation maintains a 
single, centralized server for a VO. To provide for 
availability even if the CAS server is unavailable, we 
will develop a caching server to act as a lightweight 
partial mirror of a CAS server. This caching server will 
accept requests to cache certain types of signed policy 
statements (for example, all rights granted to a user) and 
then periodically request these signed statements from 
the VO’s CAS server. The caching server will accept 
CAS-protocol requests from users by returning these 
cached signed policy statements. 
6.2. Resource-Server-Pull Support 
In addition to current model in which the user pushes 
the policy assertions to the resource server, we will 
investigate a model in which the resource server, rather 
than the client, contacts the CAS server for policy 
assertions.. This model could be combined with the 
caching server, described in the preceding section, for 
performance and reliability: the caching server could 
periodically contact the VO’s CAS server for a signed 
policy assertion including all rights granted on a 
resource, and the resource server could query that 
caching server. 
6.3. Local Authorization Server 
We are investigating the possibility of implementing a 
local authorization server that would accept 
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authorization queries from request servers, apply all 
applicable local and community policies, and return a 
yes or no answer. This authorization server would need 
to be highly trusted by the resource server and highly 
available (sites would probably run a local authorization 
server on each resource server host.) 
This service could potentially take CAS credentials, 
forwarded by the resource, and use their credentials in 
making its decision, or it could contact the CAS server 
itself using the pull model described in the preceding 
section. 
Such a server could be implemented by using Akenti 
or PERMIS, as described in Section 5 
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